

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000200020004-2

15 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Exploitation of Captured Army Materiel

1. Attached hereto find memoranda explaining the reasons for CIA's dealing primarily with Department of Army with reference to the above subject.

2. Responsibility for formulating plans for exploiting Army materiel in future theaters of hostilities would seem to be with DD/I. Though coordination with DD/P and DD/A is, of course, required, the substantive problem, estimates of manpower required, and the arrangements for exploitation by American enterprises, all seem to fall primarily under the jurisdiction of the DD/I.

3. I have asked AD/SI, AD/RR and AD/O to draw up the terms which a model plan should include so that as little time as possible will be lost in developing specific plans to meet contingencies as they develop.

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4. For the moment the only possible theater to which more attention might profitably be devoted would be the Indo-Chinese. About six months ago I decided, after conferences with FE, that in view of our many problems

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ROBERT AMORY, JR.  
Deputy Director/Intelligence

Enclosure

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S ☒  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1990  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 4/01/80 REVIEWER: 009256

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11 May 1954

Mr. Amory:

Suggest that you carefully review the assignment of responsibilities of the proposed plan for Exploitation of CEM in future theaters of war.

On the basis that OO is "responsible for assuring the acquisition and technical analysis of Soviet materials in the interest of CIA, etc!" The plan provides that both prior to outbreak of hostilities as well as at the outbreak of hostilities the CIA cadre will be under the leadership of a representative of OO. It is only "during continuing hostilities" (phase 3) that the leadership of the CIA mission to be established in the theater will be an individual to be appointed by the DD/I.

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This plan was developed and coordinated with AD/CI and AD/INT by [REDACTED] I question the promise that [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] should be under the leadership of OO in Phase 1 and 2. If you have the same reservation, it seems to me that the leadership ~~could~~ be placed in an individual appointed by the DD/I based on the special circumstances then prevailing.

CSW  
END

Gene - This is an exercise of little value that OO/CI would rather than waste more time on. I'll approve it for its purpose and can always modify it as necessary.

<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; font-size: 0.8em;"> <span>UNCLASSIFIED</span> <span>RESTRICTED</span> <span>CONFIDENTIAL</span> <span>SECRET</span> </div> <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 0.7em;">(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)</div>			
<b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b> <b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
<b>TO</b>		<b>INITIALS</b>	<b>DATE</b>
1	<del>DD/CI</del>		
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<b>FROM</b>		<b>INITIALS</b>	<b>DATE</b>
1	DD/I	jm	15 Oct
2	DDCI	CPC	18 Oct
3			
<div style="display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap;"> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> ACTION</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> RETURN</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> FILE</div> </div> <p>Remarks: <i>Noted. Thanks.</i>  <i>I concur with</i>  <i>your concept.</i>  <i>CPC</i></p>			

9 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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SUBJECT: Amplification of Recommendation

REFERENCE: Report of Field Survey [REDACTED] of  
Possibilities for Augmented Intelligence Exploitation  
of Captured Enemy Materiel, dated 1 October 1953.

1. This memorandum is to provide amplification of recommendations in referenced report, as requested by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

2. With regard to the responsibility for authorizing plans and action to station CIA personnel in future theaters, the following is recommended:

a. That the DD/I assume responsibility for determining when CIA teams shall be assigned to future military theaters.

b. That the DD/I assign responsibility for preparation of CIA plans in accordance with which the teams will operate.

3. With regard to the reasons for limiting present discussions of augmented exploitation of captured enemy materiel (CEM) to representatives of the Department of the Army and CIA, the following is reported:

a. Before the team was authorized to visit the Far East, it was proposed by representatives of the Department of the Army and CIA to the Chairman, Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee (JTIS) that discussions concerning augmented exploitation of CEM between representatives of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, and CIA be sponsored by JTIS.

b. The Chairman, JTIS, determined the sentiments of representatives of the Departments named, informally, and recommended, after these consultations, that current problems relating to the augmented exploitation of CEM could best be considered in joint discussions between representatives of the CIA and the Department of the Army. The Chairman, JTIS, volunteered, at that time, to sponsor such discussions in an inter-agency committee, if developments should later make this course appear advisable.

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
c. Important factors in determining that these preliminary discussions should be held between the Department of the Army and CIA were as follows:

(1) The CIA has certain responsibilities, not shared by the Military Departments which require economic and strategic intelligence not necessarily required by those Departments.

(2) The Department of the Army, by virtue of its control of Ground Forces, normally has custody of CEM in military theaters.

d. The recommendation in paragraph 17a of referenced report was made with the knowledge that recommendations of the Army-CIA Ad Hoc Committee could be referred to other appropriate departments either directly or through JTIS, when such action became advisable.

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1 Enclosure  
Referenced Report

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Tab A

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Tab A

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PLAN FOR AUGMENTED EXPLOITATION OF CEM IN FUTURE THEATERS OF WAR

It is desirable to create a framework within which, in the event of hostilities, concrete plans can be developed for CIA action to assure adequate exploitation of captured enemy materiel with a minimum of delay. Such a framework is outlined below:

A. Prior to Outbreak of Hostilities

1. It is essential that a CIA cadre be immediately established to plan, on a continuing basis, the most efficient way to exploit CEM; either through existing Armed Services facilities or by supplementing these facilities. Plans would be closely coordinated with the Services.

2. Since the Office of Operations is responsible for assuring the acquisition and technical analysis of Soviet materials in the interests of CIA, the Department of State, and, in appropriate instances, the AEC, the cadre should be headed by a representative of that Office and should include representation from ORR and OSI to provide the substantive and technical guidance required in planning for effective exploitation of captured enemy materiel.

3. Each member of this cadre shall be responsible for developing in his organization one or more persons knowledgeable in regard to the acquisition and exploitation of CEM. These persons would form the nucleus for future overseas teams.

B. At the Outbreak of Hostilities

1. The CIA cadre should review military intelligence information relating to the character of hostilities and consult with the Services, as necessary, in order to determine the advisability of sending representatives of CIA to the theater, and should recommend to the DD/I appropriate action. Full cognizance should be given to the reported availability of existing Services facilities available to support CIA requirements.

2. If the CIA cadre recommends that an initial team be sent to the theater at the outbreak of hostilities, and this is approved by the DD/I and concurred in by the Theater Commander and the Senior Representative, such a team, composed of representation from CG, ORR, and OSI, as determined by the respective

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Assistant Directors of these Offices, should proceed immediately to the theater to survey the facilities available for exploitation of CEM and to determine what augmentation of facilities and guidance in exploitation would be necessary to meet the requirements of CIA, the Department of State, and the AEC. The team captain should be a representative of the Office of Operations.

3. This initial team will determine with the Senior Representative and theater authorities what augmentation, if any, is necessary and will make recommendations to both the Senior Representative and the DD/I in regard to the type and scope of such augmentation.

C. During Continuing Hostilities

1. In a case where the sending of a team to the theater was not recommended at the outbreak of hostilities, the CIA cadre at headquarters would undertake a continuing review of the developing situation to determine whether or not a team should be sent to the theater at a later date.

2. In a case where a CIA initial team was sent and it is determined that Services facilities are and will continue to be adequate, it may be necessary to leave only minimum CIA representation in the theater to advise in regard to the coordination of collection and exploitation.

3. If considerable augmentation of Service facilities in an active theater of war is deemed necessary, a CIA mission charged with the collection and exploitation of CEM [REDACTED] will be established in the theater under the leadership of an individual appointed by the DD/I. Such arrangements would of necessity be subject to the concurrence of [REDACTED] and/or the Theater Commander.

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